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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920379-CA 
v, : 
JASON EWELL : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Did the Court err by grafting onto the firearm 
enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) (1990), a 
requirement that a defendant must "later" be convicted of the 
second firearm felony in order for his sentence to be enhanced? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In one information, defendant was charged with one 
count of aggravated robbery. In a second unrelated information, 
he was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, one count of 
theft, and one count of theft by deception. 
The first count of aggravated robbery was tried to a 
jury, which returned a verdict of guilty. Prior to sentencing on 
this count, defendant pled guilty to the other aggravated robbery 
count, and the court dismissed the remaining charges. 
The court sentenced defendant on both counts of 
aggravated robbery on February 28, 1992. Defendant received a 
five to life sentence on the jury verdict; he then received a 
five to life sentence on the guilty plea. The court then added a 
five year enhancement to the first sentence pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 76-3-203(4) (1990). 
In an opinion issued August 17, 1993, this Court 
reversed the five year enhancement and affirmed the court's order 
in all other respects. State v. Ewell, No. 920379-CA (Utah App. 
August 17, 1993) (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are accurately set out in the Court's 
opinion. Ewell, No. 920379-CA, slip op. at 1-3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The firearm enhancement statute provides for 
enhancement of the sentence of a "person who has been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was 
used . . . and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was 
used . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) (1990). There is no 
requirement that the first sentence must precede the second 
conviction; all that is required is that defendant "has been 
sentenced" and ".is convicted" (emphasis added) . 
The lead and concurring opinions of the Court construe 
"convicted" as used in this statute to refer to a finding of 
guilt. Under this definition, defendant was "convicted" twice 
and then sentenced twice; thus, his second "conviction" did not 
chronologically follow his first sentence. However, the statute 
does not require this sequence. Since defendant was sentenced on 
one count and stood convicted of the other, the requirements of 
the statute were met and the enhancement correctly imposed. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT ERRED IN GRAFTING ONTO THE FIREARM 
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE A REQUIREMENT THAT A 
DEFENDANT MUST BE "LATER" CONVICTED OF THE 
SECOND FIREARM FELONY IN ORDER TO ENHANCE HIS 
SENTENCE 
The lead and concurring opinions in this case found 
that the trial court violated the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203(4) (1990). That section reads, in pertinent part: 
Any person who has been sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment for a felony in which a 
firearm was used . . . and is convicted of 
another felony when a firearm was used . . . 
shall, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate 
term to be not less than five nor more than 
ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
The lead opinion read into this section a requirement of 
chronological sequence: 
Ewell argues that the statute applies only 
where one, who has been sentenced for a 
firearm felony, is later convicted of another 
firearm felony. Ewell claims that both 
convictions preceded the sentencing. 
Therefore, there was no second or subsequent 
conviction involving a firearm to trigger 
this section. 
Ewell, slip op. at 5 (lead opinion) (original emphasis deleted; 
emphasis added). The concurring opinion tacitly adopted this 
sequence requirement. Id. at 7 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The 
legislature chose to require that a person be 'sentenced' to a 
term of imprisonment and then be 'convicted' of another felony 
using a firearm before the enhanced penalty would be imposed" 
(emphasis added)). 
3 
However, the plain language of the statute contains no 
sequence requirement. The only statutory requirement for the 
enhancement to apply is that a person "who has been sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was used . 
. . is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used." 
Utah Code Ann. § 7(5-3-203(4) (1990). These requirements were met 
in this case. After defendant was sentenced pursuant to the jury 
verdict, he was also "convicted" of the guilty plea. 
This result obtains even if, as the concurrence states, 
"a defendant [is] "convicted' upon the establishment of guilt, 
not upon sentencing," Ewell, slip op. at 8 (Jackson, J. 
concurring). 
Had the legislature intended the result reached by the 
Court, it could easily have included the word "subsequently" or 
"later" before the word "convicted" in the statute. Since the 
statute is susceptible to a rational and just interpretation as 
written, the additional terms should not be judicially grafted 
on. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co, v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 
107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945) (statutory 
interpretation "must be based on the language used, . . . and the 
court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an 
intention not expressed"). 
Applying the statute as written requires affirming the 
sentence enhancement imposed by the trial court. This result 
also creates a more reasonable rule for the future. Courts 
frequently aggregate "convictions" for a single sentencing. No 
4 
interest is served by requiring a trial court to sentence a 
defendant on one count before accepting his guilty plea on a 
second count, on peril of relieving the defendant of a firearm 
enhancement. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant rehearing and modify its 
opinion to affirm the trial court's imposition of the firearm 
enhancement. 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Pursuant to 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2J_ day of August, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ElpERP^M/ORWS, 
stant Attorney General 
CERTIFICTTETOF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to CHARLES F. LLOYD, JR. and ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, SALT 
LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, Attorneys for Appellant, 424 
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^ 1 
day of August, 1993. 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
r i l a E V 
Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before AUG 1 7 1993 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Clerk'Gtf'ttifliCourt 
V* ^ y T - N o o n a n 
' Clerk of thftrru,* 
— - o o O o o — ~ 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jason Ewell, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 920379-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 17, 1993) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Attorneys: Charles F. Loyd# Jr. and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant, Jason Ewell, appeals his convictions of 
aggravated robbery, claiming the trial court should have granted 
a mistrial due to a juror's possibly prejudicial statement during 
voir dire and claiming the court misapplied the firearm 
enhancement statute. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
On December 12, 1991, Ewell was tried to a jury on one count 
of aggravated robbery. On the second day of the jury trial 
before Judge Sawaya, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the 
basis that he had just learned that one of the jurors, Jeffrey 
Bogaard, had been excused for cause from Judge Rokich's courtroom 
two days earlier due to Bogaard's statement during voir dire that 
a defendant's choice not to testify might affect his decision. 
In the earlier trial, Judge Rokich stated, "Now, there's a jury 
instruction to the effect—that will be given to those finally 
chosen—that the defendant does not have to testify if he doesn't 
desire to do so. Would you hold that against him, if he didn't 
testify?" Bogaard responded, "I'm not sure if it would sway my 
opinion one way or another. I would want—depends on the course 
of the trial, it might sway me. I have no opinion one way or 
another. Depending on what comes out, it might have an effect." 
Shortly after giving this answer, Bogaard listened to Judge 
Rokich lecture him on a defendant's constitutional right to 
remain silent and on the presumption of innocence. 
In the second trial, Judge Sawaya explained: 
Under the law, ladies and gentlemen, a 
defendant charged with a criminal offense is 
presumed to be innocent until he's been 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the evidence doesn't rise to that level then 
your duty as jurors would be to return a 
verdict of not guilty. The defendant has the 
right to remain silent meaning he doesn't 
have to take the stand and testify unless he 
wishes to. The Defendant may be satisfied 
with the evidence presented by the state and 
feel that there's nothing to add to it. Are 
there any of you who feel you cannot afford 
to the defendant the benefit of the 
presumption of innocence and his right to 
remain silent? 
No jurors responded. 
Defense counsel challenged for cause the continued seating 
of Bogaard, arguing that the juror's answers were inconsistent 
and that therefore he may have been dishonest when he answered 
Judge Sawaya's question, and thus the juror's ability to be fair 
was questionable. The judge denied the motion, stating that 
during the voir dire in the present case, he had Minstructed [the 
jurors] and part of that was that the defendant has a right not 
to testify and that his failure to testify is not a circumstance 
that you can hold against him and no presumptions against him can 
be raised.11 The court concluded that "I am satisfied that Mr. 
Bogaard and all the members of this panel are willing to follow 
the law of the case as I state it and that no adverse presumption 
would be raised against the defendant." The jury found Ewell 
guilty as charged. 
In a separate case, Ewell pleaded guilty to one count of 
aggravated robbery on January 12, 1992. On February 28, 1992, 
the court sentenced Ewell for both convictions as follows: one 
term of five years to life with a one year firearm enhancement 
for the first conviction, another term of five years to life with 
a one year firearm enhancement on the second conviction, and an 
additional five year firearm enhancement because
 vEwell had been 
convicted of two crimes involving firearms. Ewefl appealed both 
cases, claiming the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial 
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due to juror bias, and in misapplying the five-year firearm 
enhancement statute. This court consolidated the appeals. 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
Initially, we address Ewell#s motion to supplement the 
record with the transcript of the voir dire in Judge Rokich's 
courtroom in State v. Ramirez, two days before Ewell's trial. 
The State does not object to this court taking judicial notice of 
the portion of the Ramirez transcript pertaining to this case.1 
Given that the parties do not dispute the contents of the 
transcript, we grant the motion to supplement the record with the 
portion of the Ramirez transcript regarding Bogaard's voir dire. 
MISTRIAL 
We next consider the State's claim that Ewell waived his 
claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
mistrial because defense counsel failed to ask the court to 
interrogate Bogaard about his voir dire answer. In McDonouah 
Power Eauip.. Inc. v. Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845 
(1984), the Court stated in a footnote that if a party thinks a 
voir dire answer is factually incorrect at the time of a voir 
dire examination and the party chooses not to interrogate the 
juror further regarding the voir dire answer, the party would be 
barred from later challenging the composition of the jury. !£. 
at 550 n.2, 104 S. Ct. at 847 n.2. 
The State claims that under McDonouah. counsel must ask the 
court to interrogate the juror in order to preserve the issue on 
appeal. We disagree. First, the Court in McDonouah did not base 
its holding on the waiver issue. Therefore, the statements in 
the McDonouah footnote are dicta. Second, in this case, defense 
counsel was not aware that Bogaard's voir dire response was 
possibly inconsistent with a previous response until after voir 
dire had concluded. Therefore, McDonouah does not require this 
court to bar Ewell from raising his claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. 
As a general rule, an attorney must timely object in a 
clear and concise manner. State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 
1. Rule 201(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that a 
19judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.99 
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1222 (Utah 1986). In this case, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial on the basis that Bogaard's ability to be fair was 
questionable. Thus, the defense counsel alerted the court to the 
issue. Because the objection was timely, clear, and concise, we 
hold that Ewell is not barred from raising the issue on appeal. 
We next address whether the trial court erred in failing to 
grant a mistrial due to Bogaard's differing responses during voir 
dire in Judge Rokich's courtroom and later in Judge Sawaya's 
courtroom. To determine whether a juror, challenged for 
answering falsely on voir dire, should be excused, we apply the 
two-prong McDonouah test. State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243, 245 
(Utah 1992) (referring to the test outlined in McDonouah, 464 
U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850). Under the McDonouah test, a 
moving party is entitled to a new trial if the party demonstrates 
that (l) "a juror failed to answer honestly a material question 
on voir dire," and (2) Ma correct response would have provided a 
valid basis for a challenge for cause.11 McDonouah, 464 U.S. at 
556, 104 S. Ct. at 850. 
Here, Bogaard had earlier been excused for cause from Judge 
Rokich's courtroom based on his answer to the judge's voir dire 
question as to whether Bogaard would hold it against the 
defendant if he did not testify. Bogaard did not absolutely 
state that he would hold it against the defendant. Instead, he 
said he was not sure whether it would sway his opinion. He then 
said he had no opinion on the subject. Shortly after this 
answer, Bogaard listened to Judge Rokich lecture him on a 
defendant's constitutional right to remain silent and on the 
presumption of innocence. 
Judge Sawaya's question, while similar to that asked by 
Judge Rokich, was more extensive and contained more information 
about a defendant's right not to testify and the presumption of 
innocence. Briefly, Judge Sawaya informed the jury that a 
defendant has the right to remain silent, does not have to 
testify, and is nevertheless presumed innocent. Given the 
difference between the two questions and the two lectures, 
Bogaard's answer does not appear dishonest. See McDonouah, 464 
U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850. We therefore need not reach the 
second prong of the McDonouah test. 
We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to 
either conduct further investigation or grant Ewell's motion for 
a mistrial. 
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ENHANCEMENT 
The remaining issue is whether the trial court erred in 
imposing the additional five year firearm enhancement pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(4) (1990)• 
Ewell claims the trial court misconstrued this statute when 
it assessed a mandatory five year enhancement for a second 
conviction involving a firearm. Ewell argues that the statute 
applies only where one, who has been sentenced for a firearm 
felony, is later convicted of another firearm felony. Ewell 
claims that both convections preceded the sentencing. Therefore, 
there was no second or subsequent conviction involving a firearm 
to trigger this section. 
We agree. The relevant portion of section 76-3-203(4) is as 
follows, with our emphases: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which 
a firearm was used . . . and is convicted of 
another felony when a firearm was used • . . 
shall, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate 
term to be not less than five nor more than 
ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
We interpret a statute "according to its literal wording 
unless it would be unreasonably confusing or inoperable. It is 
presumed that a statute^ is valid and that the words and phrases 
used were chosen carefully and advisedly.11 Amax Magnesium Corp. 
v. Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990); accord Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.. 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). We independently review 
a trial court's interpretation of statutory law for error. State 
v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
Given our assumption that the legislature chose carefully 
and advisedly the terms ••sentenced11 and "convicted," we reject 
the State's contention that pursuant to this statute, "defendant 
was not convicted of either crime until he received his 
sentence.91 We hold that the legislature meant that a court may 
impose the five-year firearm penalty only where a defendant has 
first been sentenced in a firearm felony case and then is 
convicted of another firearm felony. See State v. Archuletta. 
920379-CA 5 
526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974) ("there is nothing to construe 
where there is no ambiguity in the statute"). 
We therefore reverse the five year enhancement portion of 
Ewell's^enfcence and affirxiuthe court's order in all other 
Btf^ nal W. Garff# Judg 
Jackson, Judge (concurring): 
I concur with the result reached today. However, I write 
separately to point out that the term "convicted," as used in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) (1990), means the establishment of 
guilt, not the imposition of the judgment and sentence upon a 
finding of guilt. While I recognize that the word "convicted" 
is used in either context in various statutes and procedural 
rules,1 it is apparent that the legislature used the term 
1. The word "conviction" is capable of conveying two meanings. 
First, "conviction" has a common meaning indicating a finding of 
guilt. See State v. Stewart. 171 P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1946) (a 
plea of guilty amounts to a "conviction"); State v. Garcia. 659 
P.2d 918, 923 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) ("conviction" refers to a 
finding of guilt and does not include the imposition of a 
sentence in the statute at issue); State v. Smith. 677 P.2d 715, 
716 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (entry of judgment of conviction is not 
equivalent to a conviction for purposes of this statute), cert. 
denied. 691 P.2d 89 (1984); State v. Wimmer. 449 N.W.2d 621, 622 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (the word "conviction" in common language 
and sometimes in statutes signifies the finding that a person is 
guilty); State v. Kellv. 582 P.2d 891, 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) 
(a "conviction" is a finding of guilt, as distinguished from the 
judgment and sentence, for purposes of our habitual criminal 
statute); Sands v. State. 262 A.2d 583, 588 (Md. Ct. App. 1970) 
("conviction" and "sentence" are legally distinct with 
"conviction" being the determination of guilt and "sentence" 
being the judgment entered). 
Second, the word "conviction" has a more technical meaning 
referring to the entire criminal procedural process, including 
the judgment and sentence. See State v. Duncan. 812 P.2d 60, 64 
(Utah App. 1991) ("it is the final judgment of the court on a 
guilty verdict or plea that constitutes a conviction for 
(continued...) 
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"convicted" in the enhancement statute at issue to mean the 
establishment of guilt. 
The legislature chose to require that a person be 
"sentenced" to a term of imprisonment and then be "convicted" of 
another felony using a firearm before the enhanced penalty would 
be imposed. If the legislature had intended the word "convicted" 
to include the sentencing portion of the criminal procedure, it 
would have used the term "sentenced" twice rather than 
"sentenced" and then "convicted." 
Further, several courts, interpreting the word "conviction" 
in statutes involving enhanced penalties for repeat offenders, 
use the more common definition of conviction, namely, the 
establishment of guilt by plea, jury verdict or finding of the 
court. See People v. Lindsay. 57 Cal. Rptr. 190, 193 (Cal Ct. 
App. 1964); Marcum v. State. 154 N.E.2d 376, 377-78 (Ind. 1958); 
State v. Kramer. 235 N.W.2d 114, 115-16 (la. 1975); State v. 
Smith. 650 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Burk, 
680 P.2d 980 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Padilla v. State. 568 P.2d 
190, 192 (N.M. 1977); State v. Dassincrer. 294 N.W.2d 926, 928 
(S.D. 1980); State v. Kellv. 582 P.2d 891, 894 (1978). These 
courts do not include the imposition of the sentence in the 
definition of "conviction." Ig. 
This definition also comports with the purpose of repeat 
offender enhancement statutes—to discourage continued criminal 
conduct by imposing a higher criminal penalty for a second 
similar offense. See Moore v. Missouri. 159 U.S. 673, 677, 16 S. 
Ct. 179, 40 L.Ed. 301 (1895). Twisting the meaning of the word 
"conviction" to include sentencing would thwart that purpose in 
cases such as the one before us. "A statute designed to punish a 
second offender more severely when he has not learned from the 
1. (••.continued) 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1)"); State v. Akana. 706 
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Haw. 1985) (a more technical definition of 
"conviction" includes a judgment or sentence rendered pursuant to 
an ascertainment of guilt); Department of Transp. v. Edwards, 519 
A.2d 1083, 1084 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) ("conviction" occurs when 
there is a finding of guilt and the sentence is imposed); Garcia 
v. State Bd. of Educ. 694 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1984) ("conviction" 
in its technical legal sense means final consummation of 
prosecution including judgment or sentence rendered pursuant to a 
verdict, confession, or plea of guilty), cert, denied. 694 P.2d 
1358 (1985); Wimmer. 449 N.W.2d at 622 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (the 
term "conviction" as used in statutes can include a judgment and 
sentence of the court upon a verdict or confession of guilt)• 
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penalty imposed for his prior offense should not be construed to 
apply before that penalty has had the chance to have the desired 
effect on the offender-" United States v. Abreu. 962 F.2d 1447, 
1452-53 (10th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, for purposes of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(4), it is logical that we find a defendant 
"convicted" upon the establishment of guilt, not upon sentencing. 
Norman H. Jackson, Sudge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting in part): 
I concur in the result the main opinion reaches on the juror 
issue. I respectfully dissent, however, from the reversal of the 
trial court's application of the firearm enhancement statute, 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(4) (1990). 
Defendant was charged, in one information, with one count of 
aggravated robbery. In a second unrelated information, he was 
charged with one count of aggravated robbery, one count of theft, 
and one count of theft by deception. The first case was tried to 
a jury on December 12-13, 1991. The jury found defendant guilty 
as charged. Defendant later pleaded guilty to one count of 
aggravated robbery in the other information. The counts of theft 
and theft by deception were dismissed. 
On February 28, 1992, the court sentenced defendant. First, 
the court sentenced and convicted defendant on the jury verdict. 
Next, the court sentenced and convicted defendant on the guilty 
plea. Finally, the court determined that it was required to 
impose the penalty enhancement under section 76-3-203(4), and 
sentenced defendant to an additional five years. 
Section 76-3-203(4) states, in relevant part: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which 
a firearm was used • • • and is convicted of 
another felony when a firearm was used . . • 
shall, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate 
term to be not less then five nor more then 
920379-CA 8 
ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(Emphasis added.) In reversing the enhancement imposed under 
this statute, my colleagues erroneously hold that a conviction 
precedes a sentence. 
A "conviction" is referred to in our rules as a "judgment of 
conviction" and includes "the plea or verdict, if any, and the 
sentence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (1993).! See also State v. 
Duncan. 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.) ("*conviction' refers to the 
final judgment entered on the plea or verdict of guilty"), cert. 
denied 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) .2 Thus, under our rules, it is 
not possible to be convicted without first being sentenced. The 
sentence is part of the conviction. 
Under section 76-3-203(4), all that is required for 
enhancement is that a person must have been sentenced for a 
felony involving a firearm, and then be convicted of another 
felony also involving a firearm.3 The State correctly asserts 
that "defendant was not convicted of either crime until he 
received his sentence." 
Defendant was sentenced and convicted of two separate 
unrelated crimes on the same day. At the time defendant was 
sentenced and convicted on the guilty plea, he had already been 
sentenced and convicted on the jury verdict. It does not make 
any analytical or logical difference that he was sentenced for 
the previous crime only moments before. The fact remains that he 
1. Rule 22(c) states, in pertinent part: 
Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea 
of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of 
conviction which shall include the plea or 
the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
2. Our decision in this case must not turn on how other states 
have defined the term "conviction" but on how Utah has defined 
the term. It is short-sighted for this court to suggest that for 
some purposes conviction means one thing and for other purposes 
it means something else. 
3. There is nothing in our statute to support the notion, as 
proposed by the concurring opinion, that the purpose of this 
statute is to give a defendant who has been sentenced for a 
felony involving a firearm an opportunity to think about the 
possibility of a more severe sentence before committing a second 
similar offense. 
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was "sentenced" for a crime involving a firearm and then 
"convicted" for a second crime involving a firearm. Thus, the 
trial court was correct in its assessment that defendant's 
sentence should be enhanced pursuant to section 76-3-203(4). 
The trial court did err, however, in imposing the 
enhancement for a fixed five-year term. As conceded by the 
State, section 76-3-203(4) actually provides that the enhancement 
for a subsequent conviction shall be "for an indeterminate term 
to be not less than five nor more than ten years[.]" Therefore, 
while the trial court properly determined that defendant's 
sentence should be enhanced, it erred in not sentencing defendant 
to an indeterminate term. 
I would therefore uphold the trial court's application of 
section 76-3-203(4), and correct the enhancement of defendant's 
sentence to provide for an indeterminate term. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a 
felony in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of 
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any 
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not 
less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not con-
currently. 
